THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 23

THE EFFECT OF CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS ON LICENSE
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
Governmental licensing of private activities coupled with the safeguard of
revocation now establishes and maintains standards of conduct for nearly all
trades and professions, as well as for many non-commercial activities.' The
same conduct which gives rise to license revocation proceedings may also subject
the licensee to criminal prosecution.
It is often urged that a criminal judgment resulting in acquittal should operate as res judicata in any subsequent revocation proceedings based on the same
conduct. 2Since one sovereignty is punishing a party for the same conduct in two
proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata initially seems applicable. It has been
said:
[T]he basis of the doctrine of [res judicata] is the policy and necessity of preventing
continuous litigation over the same matter to the great vexation of the parties and
the obstruction of the judicial machinery, and not the assumption that the judgment is
3
a legally or ethically correct determination of the rights of the parties.
Furthermore, the licensee's interest, although often characterized as a "mere
privilege," is of considerable importance, and revocation has a penalizing effect.
Increased protection under the due process clause is being given to the right to
work at one's chosen trade or profession. 4 Because the effect given a criminal
' The index to the Consolidated Laws of New York (McKinney, 1955), Book 68, Master
Index D-L, 880-890, lists over three hundred occupations which require licenses. For a general
discussion of licensing, its importance and extent, consult Freund, Licensing, 9 Encyc. Soc.
Sci. 447-51 (1933); Chapman, Indiana Licensing Law 5-9 (1953); Parsons, The Use of the
Licensing Power by the City of Chicago c. 9 (1952).
2
See, e.g., Silver v. McCamey, 221 F. 2d 873 (App. D.C., 1955); Cornell v. Reilly, 127
Cal. App. 2d 178, 273 P. 2d 572 (1954).
'2 Freeman, judgments § 641, at 1349 (5th ed., 1925). Consult generally Comm'r v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yale L.J. 299 (1929).
4
In a recent case involving the revocati6n of a physician's license, Justice Douglas stated in
dissent: "The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious liberty that man possesses.
Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to live, to be free, to own property.... It
does many men little good to stay alive and free and propertied, if they cannot work. To work
means to eat. It also means to live. For many it would be better to work in jail, than to sit idle
on the curb." Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954). Accord: Leakey v. Ga.
Real Estate Commission, 80 Ga. App. 272, 55 S.E. 2d 818 (1949).
There is nevertheless a controversy in administrative law as to whether a license is a
mere privilege revocable at will, Wallace v. Mayor of Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 Pac. 528 (1903),
Nulter v. State Road Commission, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937), or a right which
cannot be deprived without due process, Leakey v. Ga. Real Estate Comm'n, 80 Ga. App. 272,
55 S.E. 2d 818 (1949) (real estate dealer's license); Carroll v. Cal. Horse Racing Board, 16
Cal. 2d 164, 105 P. 2d 110 (1940) (horse racing license). The latter position is reflected in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001(e), 1008 (1947). See
also Standard Airlines v. CAB, 177 F. 2d 18 (App. D.C., 1949). The commentators also favor
this view: Davis, Administrative Law 250 (1951); Sears, Licenses and Procedural Due Process,
Brochure on Administrative Law 7 (1943).
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judgment in a subsequent license revocation hearing has important consequences for both efficient judicial administration and personal rights, it would
seem worth while to examine whether a workable and fair rule concerning the
treatment of criminal judgments in such a situation can be devised.
Usually a criminal acquittal is not accorded res judicata effect upon a subsequent hearing to revoke a license although the offense in both proceedings was
based on the same conduct. In a typical case, Silver v.McCamey, a taxicab
driver's license was revoked because of an alleged sexual assault and armed
robbery. The driver was acquitted of the assault charge at a criminal trial. The
court of appeals, while reversing the revocation on other grounds,' was careful to
state that the acquittal would not operate as res judicata and thus bar revocation for the same conduct. 7 Initially, such a categorical view appears questionable. Although the defendant had successfully defended his innocence of a
criminal charge, he might be barred on the same charge by another arm of the
government from pursuing his occupation.
Many courts have failed to give satisfactory explanations for this refusal to
follow the policy of res judicata in subsequent license hearings. Several courts,
for example, express the view that res judicata is inapplicable because the
criminal prosecutor and the licensing agency are different parties.8 The more
widely accepted view, however, is that various agencies of the same government
are in privity with each other for purposes of res judicata. 9 Other courts have
explained that res judicata is unavailable because of the fundamentally differing
purposes of the criminal prosecution and revocation proceedings. 10
5221 F. 2d 873 (App. D.C., 1955).
6The taxicab driver had been separately indicted for rape on two different dates. Trial
for the second alleged rape resulted in acquittal. After indictment (but before trial) for the first
alleged rape, the Board of Revocation and Review of Hackers' Identification Licenses held a
hearing on the rape charge pending trial which resulted in permanent revocation of the
license. The Court of Appeals held that pending the second trial the Board had power only to
suspend the license, since revocation proceedings might cause disclosure of defenses intended
for the criminal trial.
7
It should be noted that there were other facts unfavorable to the licensee. A bayonet
and pistol cartridges were found in the taxicab at the time of arrest. In this regard the court
remarked, "Misconduct need not amount to rape in order to show that a man is unfit to operate
a taxicab." Ibid., at 875.
8State v. Rowlett, 138 Fla. 330, 190 So. 59 (1939); Barach's Case, 279 Pa. 89, 123 Atl.
727 (1924).
' Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402 (1940); United States v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F. 2d 141 (C.A. 7th, 1944); George H. Lee Co. v. FTC, 113 F. 2d 583,
585 (C.A. 8th, 1940). On the other hand, if two different governing entities, i.e., separate
states or the nation and a state, instigate the separate proceedings, res judicata then can be
rightfully rejected because of the difference in parties. Garsson v. Wallin, 279 App. Div. 1111,
113 N.Y.S. 2d 1 (3d Dep't, 1952), aff'd 304 N.Y. 702, 107 N.E. 2d 604 (1952); Barach's Case,
279 Pa. 89, 123 Atl. 727 (1924). Consult von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yale L.J. 299,
302 (1929).
10E.g., State v. Lewis, 164 Wis. 363, 159 N.W. 746 (1916).
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[Revocation] [p]roceedings... are not in their nature an effort to further punish one
who may already have been punished for the same offense, but are the rightful exercise of the power of the state to protect its citizens from physicians of bad character."
Such a distinction is difficult to acknowledge because criminal punishment is
also instituted at least partially for the protection of society. Moreover, deprivation of such valuable interests as the right to engage in a chosen trade, profession, or business, or to operate an automobile is as much a punishment to the
2
accused as the deprivation of money by fines or even incarceration.
A more concrete objection to applying res judicata is that the two proceedings differ in amount of proof required. 3 For example, in Commonwealth v.
Funk, 4 the state sought to revoke an automobile operator's permit for violation
of the motor vehicle laws. The licensee had previously been acquitted of driving
while intoxicated-the substance of the accusation against him in the revocation
hearing. In holding that the result of the criminal prosecution did not bar a subsequent administrative proceeding based on the same set of facts, the court said:
In criminal proceedings the guilt of the accused must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In a civil proceeding to revoke a license it is sufficient if the offense be established by a preponderance of evidence. 15
The objection to applying res judicata because of differing burdens of proof
has been rejected, however, in a number of federal cases involving statutory forfeiture actions following criminal acquittals. In the leading case of Coffey v.
United States"6 the Supreme Court decided that a judgment acquitting the defendant of a tax fraud was conclusive of his innocence in a statutory forfeiture
action to confiscate the distillery equipment and apple brandy used in committing the fraud. The Court rejected the argument based upon the difference
in burdens of proof and held that "a subsequent trial of the civil suit amount[ed]
to substantially the same thing, with a difference only in the consequences following a judgment adverse to the claimant."'17 The Coffey case, however, has
been severely criticized' s or distinguished away in subsequent forfeiture cases' 9
3 Ibid., at 366 and 747. Similar language is found in Cornell v. Reilly, 127 Cal. App. 2d
178, 184, 273 P. 2d 572, 576 (1954); Barach's Case, 279 Pa. 89, 95, 123 At. 727, 729 (1924);
In the Matter of Smith, 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 449, 459 (1833).
12See note 4 supra.
13Silver v. McCamey, 221 F. 2d 873 (App. D.C., 1955); Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa.
390, 400, 186 AUt. 65, 70 (1936); Tapley v. Abbott, 111 Cal. App. 397, 295 Pac. 911 (1931).
14 323 Pa. 390, 186 Ad. 65 (1936). A dictum in this case raises the collateral problem of the
evidentiary use of a prior criminal judgment, which is discussed at pp. 342-43 infra.
16116 U.S. 436 (1886).
1 Ibid., at 400 and 70.
17Ibid., at 443. Statutory forfeiture suits are actions in rem to confiscate property used in
activity forbidden by statute.
is
Justice Clark has observed that the Coffey case "has received a distinctly unfavorable
press." United States v. One Dodge Sedan, 113 F. 2d 552, 553 (C.A. 3d, 1940) (held, that acquittal of husband did not bar forfeiture of the auto allegedly used in the crime, since the wife
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and has been repudiated in a similar body of cases involving tax penalty damages.2" In light of the deterioration of the Coffey doctrine, most courts today
would probably recognize the difference in burdens of proof as a valid reason for
not applying res judicata in license revocation proceedings.
An inherent difficulty in applying res judicata as a general principle to license
cases lies in the fact that different issues may arise in the criminal and revocation proceedings. Revocation proceedings may scrutinize the licensee's behavior
for conduct which denotes technical unfitness, breach of professional ethics,21 or
moral turpitude. 22 Criminal trials inquire only into whether the defendant committed a specified crime on a particular occasion. For example, it was held in the
early New York case of In the Matter of Smith 3 that a physician's state medical
license could be revoked for professional misconduct arising from the performance of an alleged abortion although the physician had been acquitted of abortion at a criminal trial. The acquittal resulted, however, from a finding that the
child in the abortion had not been "quick" so that the offense charged was not
punishable under existing New York criminal law. 24 The failure to accomplish a
of the acquitted held legal title to the auto). Consult also Multiple Punishment Under the
Double Jeopardy Rule, 31 Col. L. Rev. 291 (1931).
UgA recent case following the Coffey case is United States v. One De Soto Sedan, 85 F.
Supp. 245 (E.D. N.C., 1949), aff'd 180 F. 2d 583 (C.A. 4th, 1950). Contra: United States v.
Physic, 175 F. 2d 338 (C.A. 2d, 1949) (acquittal for unlawful transportation of heroin held
no bar to forfeiture of automobile which was allegedly used in the transportation); People
v. One 1950 Cadillac 2-Door Club Coupe, 133 Cal. App. 2d 311, 284 P. 2d 118 (1955); State v.
Dubose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So. 2d 477 (1943).
Since forfeiture is regarded in these cases as a cumulative punishment for a criminal offense
there is logical justification in not punishing a person previously acquitted of the offense.
One case considering whether a criminal acquittal estops a license revocation, Steele v. State
Road Comm'n, 116 W.Va. 227, 179 S.E. 810 (1935),has stated by dictum that the Coffey case
did not control because it was "the minority rule." Ibid., at 229 and 811. The court relied on
Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897). The crime with which the defendant was charged
and acquitted in the Stone case was for "cutting or removal of timber from the lands of the
United States." Ibid., at 179. The federal government then sued the defendant for conversion
of the timber, claiming that the Coffey case did not apply to a civil action brought by the
government in its capacity as a property owner. The Supreme Court accepted this distinction,
emphasizing that the penal purpose of the forfeiture suit in the Coffey case distinguished it
from the instant case. Ibid., at 186.
20 Since Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), it has been settled that acquittal of
fraudulently evading the Internal Revenue Code does not bar a suit for penalty damages for
the same alleged tax evasion.
21See, e.g., 5 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 63-605, authorizing revocation of a certified public
accountant's license if he is "guilty of any ...default discreditable to his profession."
22
See, e.g., 11 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1951) Pt. 1, § 63-1120, authorizing revocation of the
license of any pharmacist who is "guilty of... gross immorality .... "
23 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 449 (1833). The case is respectable authority in spite of its age. Consult Effect of Acquittal or Dismissal in Criminal Prosecution To Bar Revocation of License
of Physician or Disbarment of Attorney, 123 A.L.R. 779, 785 (1939).
24 See also, In re Lincoln, 102 Cal. App. 733, 283 Pac. 965 (1930) where an attorney was
disbarred for acts involved in obtaining money by false pretenses. He had previously been
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criminal result should not preclude revocation for the ineffective attempt. Other
acquittals may rest on a finding of insanity or consent. A physician indicted for
the rape of a hospital patient but acquitted for reason of consent certainly
should not be protected from a license revocation based upon breach of professional ethics or medical malpractice.
But in some situations the offense charged in the revocation proceedings will
be exactly the same as the previous criminal charge.s In Silver v. McCamey,28 for
example, the charge in the revocation proceeding was taken verbatim from the
indictment of which the licensee had been acquitted. Even so, the issues
of the two proceedings were not necessarily identical since the statute authorized revocation merely when administrative officials found such action desirable. 7 The more difficult problem is presented when the two proceedings, as
in Cootmonwealth v. Funk,s are based upon the same charges and the issues are
necessarily identical. Here, the administrative official was empowered to suspend a driver's permit whenever he found upon sufficient evidence that such
person had committed any violation of the motor vehicle laws of the state.29
The official was not authorized to revoke upon other more general grounds such
as moral turpitude or professional misconduct. Therefore, with an identity of
issues in both criminal and revocation proceedings, only the difference in burdens of proof could preclude the operation of res judicata. As a practical matter,
due to the differences in proof required, some unfairness might result in applying
res judicata to license revocations even where the issues are identical to those in
prior criminal prosecutions. Whereas persons who are not prosecuted for the
commission of crimes might be required to forfeit their licenses, others in similar
circumstances who were acquitted of the same offense would be immune from
revocation.
The discussion thus far has failed to take account of what is perhaps the most
significant practical consideration: If the doctrine of res judicata did exist within
a jurisdiction, it is doubtful that more than a few cases would come within its
ambit. License authorities would tend to form their accusations to avoid the
acquitted of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses. The disbarment authorities
indicated that the attorney's acts constituted professional and moral misconduct, regardless
of their nature as part of a criminal offense.
25 State v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 49, 190 So. 461 (1939) (medical license revoked for professional
misconduct in performing an abortion-the licensee was previoulsy acquitted of the crime
of performing the abortion); State v. Lewis, 164 Wis. 363, 159 N.W. 746 (1916); see In re Doe
95 F. 2d 386 (C.A. 2d, 1938). Contra: People v. John, 212 Ill. 615, 72 N.E. 789 (1904) (acquittal of attorney charged with embezzlement held conclusive of his innocence in a subsequent
proceeding to disbar for embezzlement);'see In re Patlak, 368 Ill. 547,15 N.E. 2d 309 (1938).
26221 F. 2d 873 (App. D.C., 1955), discussed in text at p. 337, supra.
27 D.C. Code (1951) § 47-2345.
2 323 Pa. 390, 185 Atl. 65 (1936).
29
Pa. L. (1929) No. 403, Art. VI, § 615(b), as amended, 75 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953)
§ 192(b).
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conclusive effect of a prior acquittal. In the Silver case, for example, the license
board could have avoided the question of the res judicata effect of the rape
acquittal by charging the hacker with indecent conduct or exposure. An analogous practice exists in the field of criminal law wherein prosecutors avoid the
rule against double jeopardy by splitting the offense into several charges and
prosecuting for each.30 Indeed, the usual revocation proceeding is far more
adaptable to this practice than are criminal prosecutions because grounds for
revocation such as professional misconduct allow more flexibility than a list of
specific crimes defined by statute. Even where grounds for revocation are limited
to statutory violations, as in the Funk case, the practice of framing different
accusations should be no more difficult than in criminal prosecutions.
It should be added that all the foregoing reasons for not applying res judicata
pertain equally well to the case of a petition for reinstatement of a license when
criminal acquittal follows revocation. 3'
Where the prior criminal prosecution produces a conviction rather than an
acquittal, the differing-burdens-of-proof argument is not available against
applying res judicata in the license revocation proceedings. The revocation authorities will not be tempted to phrase the charges to avoid deliberately a conclusive effect of the criminal judgment. But the statutory grounds for revocation
will determine the use of a prior conviction.32 Revocation on this ground may be
3o"[Nlot only may prosecutors use one act to fit several separate counts of the same indictment; they may frame successive independent indictments from the variety of offense
schemes applicable to the particular facts." Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double
Jeopardy, 58 Yale L.J. 513, 514 (1949). Illustrative cases are collected in Boyer, The Riddle
of Double Jeopardy in Wisconsin: The Defendant's View, 1954 Wis. L. Rev. 395, 405.
11In Qualtop Beverages v. McCampbell, 31 F. 2d 260 (C.A. 2d, 1929) reinstatement was
denied without explicit comment, however, on the retroactive conclusive effect of a criminal
acquittal. The case involved rather the question of whether the evidence of acquittal was unfairly rejected at proceedings to review the revocation. The court held that the review could
merely decide whether the revocation proceeding was arbitrary or based on an erroneous
view of the law.
The negative implication is that the acquittal would not have a conclusive effect on reinstatement. Of course, a license revocation will not operate as res judicata upon a subsequent
prosecution. Revocation, while nominally for a criminal offense, might have been based
upon non-criminal grounds, thus creating different issues in the two proceedings. Moreover,
the defendant would be denied the protection of the reasonable doubt rule in the criminal trial
because the revocation was based upon a mere preponderance of evidence.
Likewise, if a license is not revoked in a hearing prior to a criminal trial the doctrine of res
judicata should not be applied. The doctrine would have the undesirable effect of preempting
criminal prosecution. Also the failure to revoke may mean only that, despite a finding of
guilt, the agency used its discretionary authority not to revoke, or that the offense did not
come within any of the prescribed grounds for revocation.
12The following excerpt is representative of statutory authority for license revocation upon
criminal conviction: Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 62, Arts. 6-16 (Revocation of Fur Dealer's
License): "(1) Any violation of the game and fish laws, or of any rule or regulation of the [Game
and Fish] commission shall be grounds for the suspension of any license.... (2) Upon conviction
of such violation in any court of this state, any license shall be revoked by the commission...."
The propriety of revoking a license for criminal conduct prior to any criminal trial was
considered in Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882). In that case an attorney was summarily
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discretionary with the license authorities. Where conviction is not a statutory
basis for revocation, the conviction will have no conclusive effect on the license

proceedings.
While the courts generally have refused to give prior criminal judgments res
judicata effects in license revocation hearings, several cases3 4 and commentatorsu favor admitting the judgment into evidence. In Commonwealth v. Funk,
for example, the court stated:
[A] criminal prosecution does not bar a subsequent... administrative proceeding
based on the same set of facts, nor does a judgment rendered therein have any probative effect beyond its rendition.36 [Emphasis supplied.]
Where the judgment was acquittal, however, neither the cases nor the commentators reveal the use to which the fact of rendition is to be put. Assuming the
disbarred by a United States District Judge because of the attorney's instigation of and participation in the lynching of a federal prisoner. The court upheld the disbarment, ruling that disbarment before criminal trial is permissible in matters in which the attorney "is guilty of gross
misconduct in his profession, or of acts which, though not done in his professional capacity,
gravely affect his character as an attorney." Ibid., at 280. Accord: In re Wills, 293 Ky. 201,
168 S.W. 2d 730 (1943); In re Young, 77 Mont. 332, 250 Pac. 957 (1926). Contra: In re Chappell, 33 N.E. 2d 393 (Ohio App., 1938).
When revocation proceedings are held during pendency of a criminal trial for the same
offense two problems are raised. First, does the unfairness involved in compelling the licensee
to reveal possible defenses before trial amount to a denial of due process? See Silver v. McCamey, 221 F. 2d 873 (App. D.C., 1955). Second, is the indictment admissible as evidence in
the license proceedings? Refer to discussion of conviction as evidence at text pp. 342-43.
3-Consult,
e.g., 20 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1951) Art. 7458: "The right to practice
veterinary medicine in this State may be revoked by any court of competent jurisdiction upon
proof of the violation of the law in any regard thereto or for any cause for which the State Board
of Veterinary Medical Examiners is authorized by law to refuse to admit to its examinations.
:.."; Art. 7459: "The State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners may refuse to admit to
its examinations or to issue the certificate provided for by this law for any of the following
causes: The presentation to the Board of any license, certificate or diploma which was illegally
or fraudulently obtained, or when fraud or deception has been practiced in passing the examination; conviction of a crime of the grade of felony, or one which involves moral turpitude; other
grossly unprofessional or dishonorable conduct of a character likely to deceive or defraud the
public; or for habits of intemperance or drug addiction calculated to endanger the lives of
patients" (italics added).
34 Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 Atl. 65 (1936). Accord: In re O'Brien, 95 Vt.
167, 113 Atl. 527 (1921). But cf. Qualtop Beverages v. McCampbell, 31 F. 2d 260 (C.A. 2d,
1929).
Dean Wigmore argued, "But may not a judgment in a prior cause be at least admissible
as evidence when the issue there investigated was substantially the same as the present one?
.*. Is not the finding of a judge, or the verdict of a jury, based on at least as thorough an
inquiry as... other reports and certificates? Has it not some value as evidence, even though
not conclusive?" IV Wigmore, Evidence § 1346a, at 671 (3d ed., 1940). Illustrative cases and
more specific discussion are found at V Wigmore, Evidence § 1671a (3d ed., 1940). Accord:
1 Greenleaf, Evidence § 537 (16th ed., 1899); Starkie, Evidence *361 (9th Am. from 4th Eng.
ed., 1869). But compare Judgment of Conviction-Effect on a Civil Case as Res Judicata or as
Evidence, 27 II. L. Rev. 195 (1932), where it is suggested that the probative value of the conviction is too conjectural to warrant its admission as evidence.
36323 Pa. 390, 400, 186 Atl. 65, 70 (1936).
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evidence is competent, it surely can be indicative of nothing more than the fact
that twelve men, judging the same facts by a different standard, decided that
the defendant was not guilty of a particular crime. When the fact-finders are
satisfied as to the licensee's guilt or misbehavior from other evidence, are they to
disregard the fact of rendition, or should they change their finding as a result of
it? Either choice involves a speculation as to what the jury would have done if
not restricted by the reasonable doubt rule. This task is in its nature impossible.
The evidence has no relevance beyond that which the fact-finders choose to give
it. On the other hand, where the prior judgment was a conviction, the fact of
rendition may have a legitimate evidentiary use. Where not in itself a ground
for revocation, the conviction may be relevant to such statutory grounds for
revocation as professional misconduct or commission of a crime involving moral
7
turpitude.1
In conclusion, prior criminal acquittals have a limited relevance in license
revocation proceedings, but convictions have considerably more relevance.
Nevertheless, in both situations there are theoretical and practical objections to
the use of res judicata which override its salutary policy of diminishing litigation. Convictions may be relevant as evidence, but admitting evidence of the
rendition where the licensee has been acquitted has no utility beyond allowing
the fact-finders a discretionary power to give the acquittal a conclusive effect.
The latter practice would lead to uneven and uncertain--and hence undesirable
-results.
37 Refer to note 33 supra.

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIAL SALE IN PREVENTING
UNECONOMICAL PARCELLATION OF
INHERITED LAND
For over one hundred years it has been the general rule in the United States
that intestate property descends equally to the decedent's children, subject to
the rights of the surviving spouse.1 Developed largely in response to democratic
ideals of equality2 and dignity of ownership, 3 partible inheritance has been increasingly criticized in modem times. Proponents of land reform claim that
parcellation, especially of agricultural land, 4 among several heirs through sucI Consult, for a brief survey, Wypyski, The Law of Inheritance (Legal Almanac Series,
1953).
2 See Rheinstein, Cases on Decedents' Estates 28 (2d ed., 1955).
Sayre, Recent Ideologies in the Law of Succession to Property, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 691, 693
(1938). For discussions on the beginnings of partible inheritance in the United States consult
Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the American Colonies, 51 Yale L. J. 1280
(1942); Morris, Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in America, 27 Col. L. Rev. 24 (1927).
4 It has been estimated that five out of six farmers die intestate. Johnson and Barlowe, Land
Problems and Policies 287 (1954).

